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Chapter 6 
 
The Quest for National Unity in Uyghur Popular 
Song: Barren Chickens, Stray dogs, Fake 
Immortals and Thieves 
 
 
Joanne N. Smith 
 
Barren chickens, stray dogs, fake immortals and thieves 
This chapter focuses on the Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim group living under Chinese 
political hegemony in an area currently known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region of Northwest China (or Chinese Central Asia).
1
 The region is home to 
seventeen nationalities, including the Uyghur, Han, Qazaq, Qirghiz, Mongol, Russian, 
Manchu, Özbäk, Tatar, Daur, Hui, Xibo, Tajik, Dongxiang, Tibetan, Salar and Tuvan 
peoples. However, only the first three are present in significant numbers.
2
 To date, the 
Uyghurs remain the largest of these groups, though the number of Han Chinese 
immigrants in the region is likely to surpass the number of Uyghurs in the near future. 
Uyghurs have viewed the Han presence as an unwelcome encroachment since Qing 
rulers began to encourage mass immigration to the region in 1821, and the desire for 
self-determination – and, for many, secession from the People‟s Republic – has been 
greatly fuelled by socio-economic competition from Han immigrants in urban areas, 
and by the collapse of the USSR and subsequent formation of independent Muslim 
states adjacent to Xinjiang in 1991.  
The concept of encouraging Uyghur national identity through cultural forms is 
not new in Xinjiang. In the 1920s, as the region groaned under the weight of heavy 
taxation levied by Chinese warlord governors , Yang Zengxin and Jin Shuren, Uyghur 
intellectuals had begun to employ elite culture (poetry and poetry recitation) as a 
means to disseminate political ideas and encourage Uyghur national identity. This 
„poetry of resistance‟ has been explored elsewhere (Rudelson, 1997: 146-53). From 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, and parallel with the rapid strengthening of Uyghur 
national identity in response to particular domestic and international conditions, 
popular forms of culture such as popular song, jokes, story telling, and oral histories 
came to play an increasingly important role in the reproduction of that identity and the 
process of ethno-political mobilization.
3
 In particular, the works of certain 
contemporary singers struck an emotional resonance with diverse sectors of the 
Uyghur populace, and began to transcend social divides of oasis origin, occupation, 
generation, political orientation, educational level and degree of religious observance. 
By focusing instead on the ethnic boundary between the Uyghurs and a monolithic 
Han „Other‟, a boundary expressed daily in symbolic, spatial and social terms in urban 
Xinjiang in 1995-1996, these singers were able to blur intra-ethnic divides to a 
significant degree.
 4
 At the same time, the hierarchical older/younger sibling 
relationship inherent in government rhetoric surrounding Han-minority relations was 
re-cast as a relationship of colonizer to colonized.  
Here, five songs released in 1995 by popular singer Ömärjan Alim are 
analysed as a means to explore the representation and reproduction of Uyghur 
national identity constructed in relation to the Han Chinese, and the quest for Uyghur 
national unity. Exploring the singer‟s agency in group identity construction, I examine 
metaphorical representations of the „colonizer‟ (the Han Chinese) and the 
„collaborator‟ (those Uyghurs thought to place personal ambition above ethnic 
loyalty).
5
 I show how these representations reflected popular perceptions held among 
disparate groups of Uyghurs across the region, forging a common sense of „emotional 
unity‟, while reproducing relational configurations of Uyghur identity in the cities, 
and going some distance to create a broad-based Uyghur national identity with the 
capability to straddle both urban and rural communities. Conversely, it is suggested 
that by highlighting the perceived barrier to Uyghur national unity – a national 
character grounded in political passivity, self-interest and opportunism – 
representations of the Uyghur „collaborator‟ may paradoxically foster negative self-
identity and low self-esteem, this perhaps explaining why certain songs have avoided 
censorship by the Chinese government. Finally, I propose that in lamenting Uyghur 
national disunity, Ömärjan Alim (intentionally or not) assumes the role of „illuminist,‟ 
providing a timely source of national enlightenment.
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Geographical origin and migration to the Turpan and Tarim basins, 840 A.D. 
To understand the foundations of Uyghur/Han conflict today, it is necessary to 
contextualize the relative histories of the Uyghur and Han peoples in the region 
known as Xinjiang. The first mention of a people called the Uyghurs refers to a 
Turkic nomadic tribe living on the steppes of today‟s Mongolian Republic. During the 
Uyghur Empire (744-840), the Uyghurs ruled the steppes from Qarabalghasun, a 
permanent city „crowded with markets and various trades‟ (V. Minorski, cited in 
Barfield, 1989: 157), and stored silk extorted from China in their fortified capital. 
When in 840 A.D. the Uyghur Empire was destroyed by Qirghiz nomads, the steppe 
Uyghurs split into three separate groups that began migrations (Geng, 1984: 6-7; 
Haneda, 1978: 5). One group went west to the Bišbaliq region north of the Tianshan 
in present-day Xinjiang, crossed the mountains, and occupied the Turpan Basin where 
it established the Buddhist kingdom of Gaochang (850-1250), and expanded its 
influence to Qarašar7 and Kucha. Subsequently, a number of Uyghurs continued on to 
Qäšqär on the southern edge of the Tarim basin and joined members of the Turkish 
Qarluq tribe, their former allies on the Mongolian steppe (Geng, 1984: 8). The 
Uyghurs of Gaochang gradually gave up the nomadic lifestyle amid the relatively 
advanced settled culture of the area and fused with the indigenous Indo-Europeans, 
becoming farmers in a class society, fond of music, excursions, and banquets (ibid: 6).  
They are believed to be the direct cultural ancestors of Uyghurs today. 
Although Chinese merchants had long been present in the region, which has 
been wholly or partially incorporated into the Chinese empire at several stages during 
its history, numbers of settled Chinese were small prior to the Qing invasion in the 
1800s, and Xinjiang (meaning „New Dominion‟ or „New Border‟) became a formal 
province of China only in 1884. In comparison, the Turkic Uyghurs had been settled 
in the region in large numbers for almost a millennium before Han Chinese began to 
officially migrate to Xinjiang in 1821. This provides ample justification for a large 
number of present-day Uyghurs in describing themselves as a stateless minority in 
their own homeland. Since coming under Chinese political hegemony, the various 
ethnic groups in Xinjiang have to greater or lesser degrees aspired to self-
determination, and the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries saw a 
number of secessionist movements flourish, if only briefly.
8
  
 Uyghur national identity: A recent phenomenon 
Notwithstanding the enduring attachment of the Uyghurs to the place they consider 
their homeland (see, for example, Gladney, 1990: 2-3), the concept of Uyghur 
national identity is a relatively new one.
9
 Firstly, the ethnonym „Uyghur‟ has suffered 
considerable discontinuity, having fallen into disuse in the 1500s as the last of the 
Buddhist Uyghurs in Turpan converted to Islam. Prior to the 1920s, the various Turkic 
Muslim groups dispersed across the region referred to themselves as musulmanlar 
[Muslims], suggesting an over-reaching Islamic identity, or employed the term 
yärliklär [locals] and used oasis-based ethnonyms such as Ürümčilik, Kučaliq, 
suggesting a series of atomized oasis identities (Saguchi, 1978: 62-63). The ethnonym 
„Uyghur‟ was to reappear only in 1921, when emigrants from Xinjiang‟s Tarim Basin 
holding a conference on Turcology in Taškänt proposed that the name „Uyghur‟ be 
used to designate all those previously known by oasis ethnonyms. The name was 
subsequently adopted by the Xinjiang provincial government in 1934, possibly at the 
suggestion of Soviet advisors who had recently completed the task of classifying their 
own minority groups (Gladney 1990: 4). Secondly, the independent regimes 
established in Xinjiang during the second half of the nineteenth century and first half 
of the twentieth
 
century cannot accurately be described as Uyghur nationalist 
movements for two reasons. On the one hand, the rebellions were rarely instigated by 
the Uyghurs (who tended rather to join others‟ movements); on the other hand, the 
rebels in each case favoured variations on the name „Eastern Turkestan‟ and described 
themselves as „Islamic‟ or „Turkish-Islamic‟, suggesting a unification of Turkic 
Muslim groups in the region (and, in the case of the secular East Turkestan Republic, 
of Muslim and non-Muslim groups). This shows that Uyghurs at that time did not 
wholly conceive of themselves as a separate ethnic and political entity. 
Since the early 90s, however, the Uyghurs‟ sense of national identity has 
greatly strengthened. This phenomenon has appeared partly as they define themselves 
more and more in relation to the perceived religio-cultural and socio-economic threat 
posed by a rapidly increasing Han immigrant population (particularly in urban areas), 
and partly in response to certain influential domestic and international events: the 
reintroduction of conciliatory minority policies by Deng Xiaoping in 1980, the 1989 
pro-democracy movement in China, the collapse of Eastern European Marxist-
Leninist parties in 1989, and, most significantly, the disintegration of the USSR and 
subsequent formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1991. It was the 
latter that definitively planted the notion of an independent state in Uyghur minds. 
Following the establishment across the border of five independent Muslim republics 
(Qazaqstan, Özbäkistan, Qirghizstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan), the Uyghurs, the 
Tatars, and the Salars became the only Central Asian Muslims in Xinjiang without an 
independent nation named after their ethnic group.
10
 The vision of the CIS republics 
has since greatly encouraged Uyghur national identity, leading to the coining in 1995 
of an alternative name – Uyghuristan – for a future independent state, and leading 
increasing numbers of Uyghurs to express resistance to Han rule in a variety of sub-
political ways.
11
  
 
The 'new folk' 
Along with negative oral stereotyping of the Han, which occurred on a daily basis in 
urban Xinjiang in the mid-1990s, popular song proved more effective in uniting 
growing numbers of Uyghurs against the Han „Other‟ than the „poetry of resistance‟ 
of the 1920s and 1930s, than competing regional attempts by intellectuals to project a 
new national consciousness (normally in print form), and even than Islam.  
For the purposes of this chapter, it will be useful first to outline a definition of 
the term „popular music‟. Grenier and Guilbault characterize the theoretical debates 
surrounding the definition of popular music as either quantitative (volume of sales and 
radio airplay); qualitative (focusing on the privileged relationships established through 
music); comparative (analyses of different genres); or political (the production and 
distribution of music by powerful institutions and the media) (1990: 390). Of these, 
the first definition fits our context to a point, but carries with it certain limitations. The 
Uyghur songs I analyse here might certainly be described as popular in the sense that 
they enjoyed huge sales, but, as Richard Middleton points out, sales figures are open 
to manipulation and distortion, and different musics sell at different rates over 
different time-spans (1990: 5-6). Further, none of these four definitions embraces the 
central notion of music becoming the vehicle for the expression of socio-political 
views. Kassabian‟s description of the three main orientations of the term „popular‟ in 
popular music and cultural studies is more helpful (1999: 116-17). The first – popular-
as-folk – suggests a home-made, unmediated, and often unpolished, local form of 
music-making. The second – popular-as-mass – invokes contemporary forms of mass-
produced and consumed music. She goes on to argue, however, that it is the third 
orientation – popular-as-populist – that has come to dominate, particularly in British 
cultural studies since the 1960s. This approach focuses on ways in which artists and 
audiences express social and political positions through music production and 
consumption. Over time, discourses on the term „popular‟ have come to embrace the 
notion that audiences consciously engage with their popular culture, rather than the 
Frankfurt School position that they are passive victims of a „false consciousness‟ 
imposed by music producers representative of dominant culture. In other words, the 
ways in which musical texts are used and interpreted are the „ongoing product of 
people‟s attempt to represent their own experiences, and to speak in their own voices 
instead of hegemonic codes‟ (Manuel, 1993: 8). Music consumption thus constitutes 
„a process of making meaning from, and contributing meaning to, popular culture‟ 
(Kassabian, 1999: 115).  
The popular-as-populist model can be usefully applied to our context, with one 
modification to account for local, political conditions. Whereas artists in democratic 
societies can be openly subversive and indeed gain sub-cultural capital from open 
rebellion, artists representing dominated ethnic groups in China cannot so readily 
flaunt social and political aims perceived to challenge the hegemony of a repressive 
state. Far from openly acknowledging their agency, Uyghur singers remain 
deliberately enigmatic when questioned about meanings and motives behind lyrical 
and musical texts for fear of political reprisal. After all, the Chinese empire itself is no 
stranger to the cynical use of music in nation-building projects, and has since earliest 
times mobilized music popular among the people in its goal to bring under one roof a 
staggering array of regional and ethnic diversities.
12
 
Artists are usually attached to state-sponsored, professional song-and-dance 
troupes [gewutuan], paradoxically better known for the co-optation and control by the 
state of traditional art forms and minority representation. Minority artists have been 
trained in these institutions since 1949, where they learn how to represent their ethnic 
identities in ways acceptable to the Chinese state (Baranovitch, 2001: 362-66). 
Correspondingly, the choice of works to be performed in official live or television 
performances is normally vetted by troupe leaders and by the local Cultural Bureau 
(Wenhuaju), responsible for monitoring the arts (Mackerras, 1985: 71-2). The latitude 
for personal interpretation, melodic subtlety, and complex asymmetrical and 
syncopated rhythms traditionally enjoyed by the soloist or small Uyghur ensemble has 
been replaced in official troupes by a large folk orchestra of traditional and 
modernized instruments working from fixed music scores, leading to simplification, 
distortion and standardization. Lyrics contain messages of „unity among nationalities‟ 
(that is, among the Han and China‟s fifty-five ethnic minority groups) and often 
promote government minority policies (Harris, 2004: Introduction).  
Since the early 1990s, Uyghur nationalist messages have been conveyed 
through the medium of „new folk,‟ one form of commercially lucrative popular music 
in Xinjiang.
13
 New folk music differs greatly from that performed by troupes in both 
performance style and lyrical content. It consists mainly of solo recordings of 
contemporary compositions, and enjoys a certain expressive freedom afforded by the 
octave-based modal structure (usually either heptatonic or pentatonic) which allows 
for interesting subtleties of tonal colour; the unique rhythms – characterized by 
extensive use of asymmetry and syncopation – associated with the traditional folk 
singing style and traditional stringed instruments such as the dutar (or two-stringed 
lute) also mark this musical tradition out as radically different from the musics 
performed by the troupes. Moreover, its song lyrics address prevalent social and 
political issues, borrowing or adapting lines by well-known and less well-known poets 
and writers.  
Like some other professional minority musicians in China, new folk singers 
Ömärjan Alim, Abdurehim Heyit, and Köräš Kösän began in the 1990s to try to 
subvert Beijing‟s control over the arts in the pursuit of alternative ethnic and national 
agendas.
14
 In so doing, they attracted varying degrees of attention from the state 
censor, which has required artists and producers to submit new releases to the Cultural 
Bureau for political checks since 1995. Alim, Heyit, and Kösän all had cassettes 
confiscated, and were often fined and/or forbidden to perform in public over the 
course of the decade.
15
 When I met Abdurehim Heyit in the southern oasis town of 
Qäšqär in August 1996, he was having difficulties releasing his new cassette through 
Xinjiang-based producers who are subject to greater scrutiny by the censor than their 
counterparts elsewhere and was not permitted to tour.
16
 Always careful to absolve 
himself of direct agency, he told me, smiling: „They don‟t like my song words. They 
say I‟m a nationalist!‟ [my emphasis]. As a professional singer attached to a song-
and-dance troupe, Heyit would normally be required to appear regularly in official 
state-controlled performances. Yet he told me he declined to appear in performances 
on Uyghur television, explaining: „I don‟t want to play the songs the producers ask me 
to play ... and they won‟t let me play the songs I want to play!‟. Perhaps the most 
famous of banned songs from this period is Ömärjan Alim‟s „Mehman Bašlidim‟ [I 
brought home a guest] from the cassette Pärwayim Peläk [Destiny is my concern]. 
The song employs an allegory in which the Han colonizer is depicted as „the guest 
who never left‟ and the Uyghurs as slaves forced into the hostile desert.17 However, 
censorship of popular music remained highly unsystematic, with some „songs of 
nationalism‟ avoiding government attention.  
 
Reproducing the nation 
One key to the success of popular music in conveying nationalist ideas is that it 
carries messages to the Uyghurs in their preferred cultural form. De Vos lists aesthetic 
cultural forms such as food, dress, music, and song as one of a number of markers of 
cultural difference that might be selected by group members in the definition of their 
group identity (1975: 9). Song and dance have been integral to Uyghur culture since 
ancient times and continue to be the mainstay and focal point of Uyghur social life, 
predominating at gatherings in the home, birthday parties, Uyghur dance restaurants, 
weddings, mäšräp [gatherings for feasting, story-telling, and music-making],18 
university dance halls, and the bazaar with its myriad cassette kiosks (Mackerras, 
1985: 62-75; Smith, 1999: 231-33; Harris, 2002: 267-70). Significantly, a love of, and 
flair for, musical performance is also one criterion by which Uyghurs differentiate 
themselves from the Han whom they often dismiss as dull and introverted.
19
   
The orality of popular song also means that it is accessible to Uyghurs from all 
backgrounds, whether rural or urban. Although the late Uyghur novelist, poet and 
historian, Abdurehim Ötkür, was an undisputed symbol of Uyghur nationalist 
aspirations in the 1980s and 1990s, his media – poetry and the historical novel – were 
circulated predominantly in urban, often intellectual, spaces.
20
 The extent to which his 
works reached the rural population – with its higher instance of illiteracy – must 
surely have been limited. Furthermore, the fact that the Uyghur language has 
undergone repeated script changes during the period of Chinese Communist rule 
means that Ötkür‟s work – published in the Arabic script („Old Script‟) – is 
inaccessible to a generation of Uyghurs educated in the Latin script („New Script‟) 
between 1960 and 1982.
21
 In contrast, song words are communicated orally and can 
be received and understood by all. This is evidently why new folk singers have begun 
to borrow the poetry of Ötkür and other nationalist writers and use it – or adapt it for 
use- in their song lyrics. By so doing, they can transmit nationalist sentiments 
originally expressed in written or print form far beyond urban, intellectual circles and 
straight into the heart of the countryside.
22
  
Thirdly, popular song can be rapidly disseminated via Xinjiang‟s low-budget 
and (partially) independent cassette industry. As Peter Manuel has shown in his study 
of mass-mediated cassette culture in North India, cassettes as one form of „new 
media‟ are affordable, easy to produce, duplicate and pass on, and largely evasive of 
central control, making them the ideal vehicle for socio-political mobilization, even 
when banned by the censor (1993: 2-4; 238). In Xinjiang, cassettes are transported 
from their place of production to large towns in the north and south. Uyghur 
merchants then buy the cassettes from urban distributors and take them home for sale 
in smaller, rural bazaars. In all of these centres, further „pirate‟ copies pass from hand 
to hand. Moreover, as in other parts of China, there is a growing trend of young 
Uyghur men coming to urban centres from the countryside to look for work. These 
migrant workers gradually become familiar with the popular discourse of „us and 
them‟ – Uyghur vs. Han – which is stronger in the city than in rural areas due to more 
intensive penetration by Han settlers, and with „nationalist‟ songs heard at the bazaar. 
When they return to the countryside, a copy of the cassette may accompany them (or 
perhaps the memorized song lyrics, in a process of oral transmission). The cassette is 
then played (or the song performed) in the rural home before an audience of relatives, 
neighbours and friends, and the images and ideas within are reproduced in rural 
settings. With the advent of this performative dimension, Tuohy argues, popular song 
becomes „an active means by which to experience the nation‟ (2001: 109).  
This brings us to the fourth reason. The specific musical (sonic) texts created 
in new folk – the unique qualities of the traditional singing voice (predominantly a 
head voice but also articulated by nasal inflections) and sounds of the dutar – make it 
enormously affective. The traditional Uyghur singing style features subtle tone shifts 
of the melodic line, free melismatic ornamentation, and, as with other Turkic musical 
traditions, a tendency to employ ululations (an inflection that draws on howls and/or 
cries to give the tone a „lift‟). With Alim‟s and Heyit‟s songs being sung almost 
exclusively within a minor (and modally heptatonic) tonal structure, this voice 
sometimes evokes fragility and a sense of mourning, at other times quivering rage. It 
embodies a sense of mingled grief and frustration, which, combined with affective 
lyrical content, can give rise to very strong emotions. In this respect, Harris cites a 
Uyghur song composer as follows:  
A people who have suffered long oppression have soft hearts, they are easily 
shattered. There is much in their hearts that is unsaid. There is a special tragic 
note to their music. (2002: 273) 
Forney, in an article for Time (2002), similarly points to the tragedy in Heyit‟s music, 
characterizing him as the „man of constant sorrow‟. The dutar, meanwhile, 
contributes to new folk‟s appeal in two important ways. Like the Serbian one-stringed 
gusle, it may be said to assume an atavistic role as its sound „travels across the dark 
centuries‟ (Thomas, 1999: 172-3), linking Uyghurs with ancestors who played the 
same instrument, and thus embodying continuity with Uyghur tradition. More 
significant still is the retention of traditional strumming patterns. 
Finally, unlike co-opted Uyghur artists Kelimu and Bahai‟erguli, who sing in 
the Chinese language, thus becoming mouthpieces for China‟s all-inclusive national 
design („singing collaborators‟?), new folk singers sing in the Uyghur language. This 
ensures that messages reach rural Uyghurs who may know little or no Chinese, and 
carries significant symbolic value. The Chinese state has frequently used vocal music 
as a vehicle for the dissemination of national standard speech (Mandarin) in the hope 
that local, regional, and ethnic loyalties might be transformed into national (Chinese) 
ones (Tuohy, 2001: 117). Where minority languages have been retained in folk songs, 
the aim has been to represent the nation‟s ethnic diversity while simultaneously 
underscoring inter-ethnic harmony through the lyrics. At the same time, the state has 
all but institutionalized the (Han) Chinese language in minority areas in the spheres of 
education and employment. By favouring the Uyghur language, Xinjiang‟s new folk 
singers not only reject the assumed superiority of the Han language but also construct 
an alternative national (Uyghur) voice. For these reasons, new folk became the ideal 
vehicle through which not only to reflect prevalent social and political concerns in 
Xinjiang in the mid-1990s but also to construct and reproduce an alternative social, 
political and national consciousness.
23
  
 
Five songs by Ömärjan Alim 
In the summer of 1996, one cassette in particular was blasted ceaselessly from 
cassette kiosks at bazaars in Ürümchi and oasis towns across Xinjiang. Wherever one 
went – Turpan, Kucha, Qäšqär, Xotän, Aqsu – Alim‟s voice rang out in private as 
well as public, rural as well as urban spaces, temporarily turning the cassette Qaldi Iz 
[Traces] into the Uyghur national soundtrack.
24
 In an interview with Harris, a sound 
engineer involved in its recording attributes its extraordinary success to Alim‟s ability 
to communicate with the peasants:  
He has a solid audience, he crosses boundaries of city and country, intellectual 
and peasant… Ömärjan has caught the heart of the Uyghur peasants, that‟s 90% 
of the population. He is popular because his words are direct, easily understood. 
He uses peasant language, proverbs. (2002: 278) 
But plain language was clearly not the sole source of the cassette‟s popularity. Its 
overwhelming success derived also from its lyrical meanings. When asked what they 
liked about Ömärjan Alim‟s songs, the vast majority of respondents indicated the 
song-words, which they described as „heavy with meaning‟ [mänisi čong], and which 
evidently articulated their situation as they perceived it. Including the gentle title track, 
„Qaldi Iz‟ [Traces], which draws on a poem and novel by the late nationalist writer 
Abdurehim Ötkür, almost every song invites reflection on common grievances and is 
conceived within an implicitly or explicitly assumed framework of opposition to the 
Han.
25
 For instance, „Bulğanğan Sular‟ [Dirtied waters], laments the environmental 
pollution believed by many Uyghurs to result from (Han) economic development of 
the region;
26
 „Aldanma, Singlim‟ [Don‟t be taken in, sister] is a didactic piece warning 
young Uyghur women not to mar their youth by frequenting discos and becoming a 
plaything for (often Han) men;
27
 „Tuğmas Toxu‟ [Barren chickens] is a blackly 
humorous critique of Han colonization of the land and enforced birth control policy; 
in „Bäzilär‟ [Some people], and „Äwliya Dostum‟ [My immortal friend], Alim 
explores the thorny subject of the Uyghur puppet official (or „collaborator‟); 
„Ränjimäyli Özgidin‟ [Let‟s not blame others] and „Häsrät‟ [Sadness] deal with 
perceived flaws in the Uyghur national character i.e. the tendency towards political 
passivity, infighting, and collaboration with the (Han) oppressor; and, finally, in 
„Därwaziwän‟ [The gatekeeper], Alim is characterized as the „illuminist,‟ keeping 
lonely watch over the fate of the Uyghur nation, determined to enlighten his people 
and steer them from repeating the mistakes of the past. Below, I analyse lyrical 
meanings in four of these songs – „Tuğmas Toxu‟, „Bäzilär‟, „Äwliya Dostum‟ and 
„Häsrät‟ – to show how social and political concerns prevalent among Uyghurs during 
this period of acute Uyghur/Han ethnic dichotomization were reflected and 
reproduced (in some cases with violent consequences) through the medium of popular 
song. Song analyses are supported by interview data gathered during a year of 
ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Xinjiang between 1995-1996, and during a 6-
week field trip to Ürümchi in 2002.
28
 
 
 The Han colonizer 
‘Tuğmas Toxu’   ‘Barren chickens’29    
 
{Tuğmas toxu yatidu    Barren chickens sit 
Uwuluqni igälläp} (x2)     And occupy the roost 
{Yürär särsan kočida    While they who‟d lay twice as many  
     eggs 
Tuxum tuğqan hässiläp} (x2)  Roam the streets 
Tuğmas toxu katäktä   Barren chickens sit in the coop 
Tallap esil dan yäydu   And eat the choice grain 
{Tuğmaydu ya katäkni   They lay no eggs yet won‟t give up 
Tuğqanlarğa bärmäydu} (x2)  The coop to those who laid 
 
Oylap qaldim turmušta   I fell to thinking that in this Life  
Barğu šundaq adämlär  Such individuals exist 
Xuddi tuğmas toxudäk  Who, like barren chickens  
Älni bizar ätkänlär   Invite the people‟s hatred 
Yašisimu undaqlar    And though they live among us 
Älgä bärmäs qilčä näp   Bring no benefit to the people  
Xuddi tuğmas toxudäk   But like barren chickens 
Ötär orun igälläp   Occupy the best position 
 
Yašisimu undaqlar    Though they live among us 
Älgä bärmäs qilčä näp   Bring no benefit to the people 
{Xuddi tuğmas toxudäk   But like barren chickens 
Ötär orun igälläp.} (x2)    Occupy the best position. 
The „barren chickens‟ in „Tuğmas Toxu‟ can be understood in at least three ways. 
According to one interpretation, they are the Han Chinese, depicted as the colonizer 
occupying the „roost‟ or the beautiful land of Xinjiang. This colonizer, while adopting 
a birth control policy designed to control its own numbers, has imposed a slightly 
modified version of that policy on minority nationalities throughout China. For many 
Muslim Uyghurs – particularly those in rural areas and the deeply religious south – 
the concept of choosing not to bear children is preposterous and therefore humorous 
(another reason for the song‟s appeal). More significantly, the policy makes it 
practically impossible for the Uyghur population to stay abreast with the rapidly 
increasing Han immigrant population. Prior to the policy‟s introduction, many 
Uyghurs raised families of between 8-14 children, considering childbirth to be a 
blessing from Xuda [Allah], and the suggestion is that, had they been allowed to 
continue, Uyghurs could have fully occupied the land instead of being ousted from it 
by the Han („they who‟d lay twice as many eggs roam the streets‟). Uyghur 
attachment to, and rightful ownership of, the land was often forcefully communicated 
by Uyghur respondents. Uyghur intellectuals, Šöhrat and Räwiä, maintained on 
separate occasions that Han Chinese have created a myth of origin regarding their 
history in Xinjiang and even that they stage archaeological tricks in order to „prove‟ 
their presence in the region for hundreds of years. Less educated Uyghurs made 
equally indignant reference to this perceived re-writing of history, as when Batur, a 
migrant worker in Ürümchi, exclaimed: „They [the Hans] say they were here first. 
They even say it in the books they write. They say they have always been here!‟ 
(Smith, 1999: 259-61).
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Based on a different reading, the „barren chickens‟ are the Uyghur leaders, 
who make no attempt to gain rights and privileges for the Uyghur people, yet continue 
to eat finer foods (choice grain) and live in better houses (roost, coop) than those 
thought to have done more for the nationalist cause. This view of ethnic Uyghur 
officials as collaborators is not new. We know that, already under the late Qing 
indigenous officials in Xinjiang retained from among local nobles conspired with 
Qing officials in the oppression of their fellow Uyghurs, although the Qing emperor 
forbade it. Along with Qing officials, they became popularly known as „dogs with 
human faces‟ (Kim, 1986: 46). In 1995-1996, amid an atmosphere of increased desire 
for self-determination, the Uyghur general public was once more extremely 
disillusioned with its indigenous representatives. Räwiä was one urban dweller who 
despaired that Uyghur leaders did not stand up to central government: „Our leaders 
say nothing. I don‟t know if they don‟t care or if they are just too scared. I would 
speak up about things if I were a cadre‟ [respondent‟s emphasis]. On another 
occasion, she argued that Uyghur leaders were „in no danger of execution‟, and 
demanded to know why they went along with adverse policies proposed by Han 
officials. Similar views existed among rural Uyghurs, though usually aimed at local, 
lower-level officials. Tursun, a peasant in his thirties from Aqsu, remarked ironically 
that much of the tax he paid made up wages for Uyghur cadres and labelled them 
parasites. This popular view is also reflected in „Tuğmas Toxu‟, especially if we read 
the „barren chickens‟ as a representation of the Uyghur leaders who enjoy many 
privileges while giving nothing back to their people. 
A third interpretation casts white-collar Han immigrants as the „barren 
chickens,‟ reflecting the widespread Uyghur concern that Uyghurs are marginalized 
by default in the urban job market where Han-run state organs and private enterprises 
hire only fluent Chinese speakers.
31
 Many Uyghurs complain that Han Chinese get 
jobs purely on the basis that their mother tongue is Chinese even though they may 
lack the necessary abilities. In this way, they potentially rob a more qualified Uyghur 
of the post. Šöhrat explained how Han academics in Xinjiang were always assigned 
the best research projects simply because they were proficient in written Chinese. In 
fact, he argued, Uyghur researchers had just as much research potential – sometimes 
more – but were denied the same opportunities due to their lower level of Chinese 
proficiency.  
With such a wide range of possible interpretations, it becomes difficult to 
identify who the „barren chickens‟ – or those they represent – actually are, and this of 
course is one reason why new folk singers can sometimes avoid detection by the 
government censor. Even without the use of metaphor, it has been hard for the 
Chinese state to know how to interpret song lyrics. Tuohy notes, for instance, that 
state leaders in the 1980s and 1990s were unable to reach agreement on whether rock 
singer Cui Jian‟s lyrics about the Chinese Communist Party‟s revolutionary heritage 
were patriotic or ironic (2001: 118). It can take some time for the authorities in 
Xinjiang to realize that a set of lyrics is politically problematic, partly due to the wide 
use of metaphor, allegory and allusion, and partly because songs are sung in the 
Uyghur language, indecipherable to all but a few Han Chinese. However, interview 
data suggest that the Cultural Bureau often does come to learn of political subterfuge, 
ironically through tip-offs by Uyghur „collaborators‟ or spies. When a cassette is 
eventually banned, however, the censorship has the opposite effect to that intended: 
ordinary people suddenly become very interested in the product. In this respect, the 
Uyghurs might be said to resemble any other people in the world.
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 Harris writes that 
Uyghur music producers and distributors in Xinjiang have actually found ways to use 
censorship to commercial advantage (2002: 279-80). When a new tape is about to be 
released, they post advertisements in shops urging customers to buy before the 
product is banned, thus stimulating public curiosity, boosting sales, and ensuring still 
wider dissemination of the nationalist ideas within. While lyrical meanings in new 
folk remain on the surface ambiguous, the people can – and do – read what they like 
into them, and those readings are invariably tempered by their perceptions of the 
social, political, and economic climate in which they live, that is, of their marginalized 
position in relation to Han immigrants and their continued oppression by the Chinese 
state.  
 
The Uyghur ‘collaborator’ 
The second song, „Bäzilär‟ [Some people], articulates popular Uyghur perceptions of 
the weakness and passivity of indigenous officials (and would-be officials) and of 
their unscrupulous pursuit of personal gain: 
 
‘Bäzilär’     ‘Some people’ 
 
{Älgä ämäs ämälgä xomar ikän bäzilär  Some are addicted not to the  
      people but to power 
 
Näpisi üčün jenidin kečär ikän bäzilär} (x2) And sacrifice their own for the  
      sake of greed 
 
{Öz bäxtini özgining jäbirisidin izdišip They seek their happiness in  
others‟ misery 
Wijdanini görägä qoyar ikän bäzilär} (x2) And pawn their consciences 
Äl čongini äzäldin ällä süyüp saylaytti In ancient times the people 
elected their leaders 
 
Lekin älning közini boyar ikän bäzilär (x2) Now some pull wool over the  
      people‟s eyes 
 
{Aläm degän barčiğa täng selinğan  The world is a table spread for all 
dastixan 
 
Lekin uni uyalmay bular ikän bäzilär} (x2) Yet some steal all without  
      scruples 
 
Yalaq yalap ögängän xuddi lalma itlardäk Like stray dogs who‟ve learned  
      to lick at the dog bowl 
 
Mötiwärlär aldida turar ikän bäzilär (x2) Some stand before the powerful 
{Mäydisigä urğanning hämmisila är ämäs  They beat their chests, but none 
are men 
 
Sesip qalğan yağačdäk sunar ikän  Just split like rotten wood 
bäzilär}(x2) 
 
Sesip qalğan yağačdäk sunar ikän bäzilär. Just split like rotten wood. 
 
Respondents interpreted some people as referring to Uyghur officials, puppet leaders 
chosen not by Uyghurs but by the Chinese government, accused of ignoring the 
misery of their people while themselves enjoying privileges extended by the Han.
33
 
One is reminded of the popular concept of the „man of the people,‟ summed up in the 
Uyghur proverb: „A good man is in touch with the people; a bad man only with 
property‟ [Yaxši är älgä ortaq, yaman är malğa].34 In addition to voicing keenly felt 
popular resentment, the song is apparently intended to prick the conscience of the 
officials themselves by accusing them of „selling out‟ their ethnic group. Once again, 
it is worth noting that this perceived phenomenon of betraying the nation is not new. 
There are an unusually large number of words in the Uyghur language that express 
precisely this notion, for instance, milliy xa’in [ethnic or national traitor]; milliy 
munapiq [scum of the nation]; wätän satquč or satqin [person who „sells‟ the nation]; 
maqulči [collaborator or „Yes-man‟].35 
In the third verse, the metaphor of the dog, used during the Qing colonial 
period, re-surfaces in the modern context. Though dogs in the wild exist in 
hierarchically ordered packs, living and hunting together as a team, the stray dog, 
once separated from the pack, becomes an opportunist and takes his chances. The 
domestic dog, meanwhile, may be characterized as parasitic, betraying his own kind 
to accept favours and an easy life under a dominant race. Contrast this with the other 
metaphor often used by Uyghurs to describe their national character, namely, the 
„sheep mentality‟. Uyghurs often complain that they are too like the sheep that grace 
their dinner table (and joke that they should eat less mutton), the implication being 
that Uyghurs bow down too easily to leadership from without. This reflects their 
tendency throughout history to accept foreign hegemony, as well as their inability to 
produce a leader from among their ranks who was able to unite them. However, the 
sheep metaphor also suggests that Uyghurs tend to think and act as one, and this does 
not bear out current social realities. The „stray dog‟ metaphor seems to reflect more 
accurately the perceived self-serving nature of the indigenous official, and can be 
linked to one of Alim‟s older themes: the idea that Uyghurs have been displaced from 
their homes by the Han „boss‟ and forced into the hostile desert.36 Once dispossessed, 
the temptation towards opportunism is too great, so that some of these exiled strays 
break away from the pack and sidle up to lick gratefully and obediently at the dog 
bowl proffered by the new master.
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In the final lines, Alim alludes to the perceived tendency of Uyghur officials to 
puff themselves up and make a big show of their status. „Some people,‟ he sings, 
pretend to be real men on the outside while inside they are broken and corrupt. The 
rotting wood metaphor evokes at once the notion of Uyghur leaders having no 
conscience and the sense that they are of no practical use – a house cannot be built 
with rotten wood. Again, we revisit the idea that a „real man‟ is a man who thinks and 
acts for his people. 
 
Social Climbers  
The third song, „Äwliya dostum‟ [My immortal friend], was interpreted by 
respondents as dealing with low and middle level officials who are perceived to 
collaborate in order to advance their social status: 
 
‘Äwliya dostum’    ‘My immortal friend’ 
{Äwliyadäk čağlaysän dostum özängni You think yourself immortal, my  
friend 
Bašqilarğa sanjisän näštär sözingni} (x2) Stinging others with your words 
{Maxtay desäm azapliq dilim köyidu  Should I think to praise you, my  
heart burns 
Maxtimaymän zadila tilim köyidu} (x2) I can‟t praise you for my tongue  
      burns  
 
Way, way, way, way… hiligär dostum (x2) O, o, o, o … my sly friend 
 
{Šir aldida tülkidäk qilisän süküt  Before the lion you fall silent as a  
      fox 
 
Ämma čüjä aldida bolisän bürküt} (x2) Yet before the chick, you‟re an  
eagle 
{Čiwin qonsa ğingšisän    You whine if a fly alights on you,  
Kaltäk tägsä jim    But when struck by a stick say  
      nothing 
Šundaq xuydin bizlärni saqla Ilahim} (x2) Allah, save us, from this  
character trait 
 
Way, way, way, way … hiligär dostum (x2) O, o, o, o … my sly friend 
Way, way, way, way … äwliya dostum O, o, o, o … my immortal friend 
Way, way, way, way … älwida dostum O, o, o, o … farewell my friend. 
 
Älwida dostum.    Farewell my friend. 
 
In the second verse, it is suggested that such individuals flaunt their status and act as 
though invincible before the „chick‟ (the powerless Uyghur people) while, on the 
other hand, becoming servile before the „lion‟ (the powerful Han and higher-ranking 
Uyghur leaders). The following lines „You whine if a fly alights on you, but when 
struck by a stick say nothing‟ can be read in at least two ways. One interpretation is 
that petty officials complain and offer excuses if an ordinary, powerless Uyghur 
approaches them for help, yet are silent and complicit when pressurized from above, 
that is, by the Han or higher-ranking indigenous officials.
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 A second interpretation 
suggests that the „stick‟ is a thick wad of money, implying that such officials do 
favours only for those compatriots who can afford to bribe them. One respondent 
explained the ironic use of the word „immortal‟ with reference to the saying „Asman 
egiz, yär qattiq‟ [The sky is high, the ground is hard]. In other words, those who over-
reach themselves have further to fall and petty officials such as these will one day 
know that they are not immortal. 
In interviews, Uyghur respondents frequently criticized individuals thought to 
be co-operating too closely with the Han authorities, for example, Uyghur officials, 
Uyghur police, and some religious personnel. Moreover, these criticisms often 
developed from the verbal level into direct action. According to Dilšat, who worked in 
tourism, a violent attack on an imam from the Idkah mosque in 1996 (one of his ears 
was cut off, and his arms slashed with meat cleavers) was intended as a warning to 
other religious figures not to collude with the Han hegemony.
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 According to him, the 
imam had „helped the government in many ways‟ and was „much hated‟. This view 
was supported by Karim, a health professional from southern Xotän, who stated: „The 
imam‟s links with the authorities were rather too close‟. The violence did not always 
stop with a warning. Since the summer of 1993, a small number of militant Uyghur 
nationalists had begun to make assassination attempts on low and middle level 
Uyghur party cadres and officials where previously they had only targeted Han 
Chinese cadres, public security officials, and military.
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 In 1995, a Hong Kong 
newspaper reported (slightly sensationally) that the Uyghur separatist movement was 
„an organisation like the “Palestinian National Liberation Front”, often conducting 
activities such as assassination with their spearhead pointed chiefly at local 
government officials, especially those in the public security departments‟.41  
Numbers of assassinations of Uyghur cadres, as well as attacks on Han police 
and soldiers, riots, and minor armed insurrections, increased significantly during the 
years 1995-1997. One particularly horrific incident in 1996, which went unreported in 
the Chinese press, involved a multiple assassination of a Uyghur cadre and three of 
his relatives in his home in Kucha (significantly, victims‟ tongues were cut out before 
their throats were slashed) and was the first occasion on which the Chinese authorities 
encountered Uyghur suicide bombers (Smith, 1997). This background, then, provides 
the context for the closing lines of the song: „Farewell my friend‟. While one reading 
suggests that it is the bad character trait (i.e. an inclination to prostitute oneself for 
power and material wealth) to which Uyghurs must say goodbye, a darker 
interpretation implies that it is Uyghur officials and social climbers – the „immortal 
friends‟ – who must bid farewell to their lives. As one respondent put it, the song‟s 
closing line then assumes the meaning: „You die!‟ [Ölisän!]. 
 
The flawed national character 
The self-perception among many Uyghurs that they suffer from a flawed national 
character is developed in more depth in the final song, „Häsrät‟ [Sadness]: 
 
‘Häsrät’    ‘Sadness’ 
 
Bir anidin tuğulğan   Born of one mother 
Qerindaštuq äsli biz    Once compatriots we 
Qoydi bizni šu küngä   What‟s brought us to this day? 
Osal päyli xuymiz   Our bad character trait 
 
Miwä bärgän däräxni   Trees which bear fruit 
Qurutmaqni oylaymiz   We leave to bleed dry 
Kim qazansa nätijä   As we snap and gnaw 
Šuni qišläp ğajaymiz   At each others‟ success 
 
Dağdam yolğa patmaymiz  No room for us to tread one wide road 
Tar kočidin qatraymiz   We hurry down our narrow lanes 
Qiltaq qurup öz ara   Building traps for one another 
Yeqitmaqni oylaymiz.  To cause each other‟s fall. 
 
According to respondents, this song is the most emotive of the four. In the words of 
Šatgül, a middle-aged Uyghur woman in the service industry: „When we hear Alim‟s 
songs, it does something to us… It gets us right in the chest [places hands on heart], 
makes us feel really agonized‟. When I asked her whether this was a good or bad pain, 
she confirmed that it was a good sort of pain, suggesting that her experience of the 
song involved a strong element of catharsis. The sadness in „Häsrät‟ derives from its 
preoccupation with notions of Uyghur national disunity (the narrow lanes as opposed 
to the wide road) and its perceived source: infighting and envy. This is a perception 
common among educated Uyghurs. For instance, two university graduates living in 
Ürümchi, Aliyä and Äziz, described the difference between Uyghurs and Qazaqs thus: 
„The Qazaqs are a much better people than us… They are not jealous of one another. 
They fight big wars, we fight small ones‟. They further cited a Uyghur saying: 
„Paltining sepi yağač tur‟ [The axe-handle is ever made of wood], in which the axe 
blade symbolizes the Han hegemony, aided by the Uyghurs (the axe-handle) in its 
oppression of the Uyghur people (the wood). 
In a 1996 interview, Dilšat told me that some Uyghurs were supplying 
information to the Chinese authorities in the hope of bettering their personal 
circumstances: „People are really scared in Qäšqär. And what they‟re most scared of 
is other Uyghurs… spies‟. These fears had multiplied by the time of my return to 
Xinjiang in 2002. Some said that the arrest of Räbiyä Qadir (popularly known as 
„Xinjiang‟s millionaire businesswoman‟) in 1998 had been made on the basis of 
information leaked to the Chinese authorities by precisely such „inside‟ spies. They 
deemed such behaviour widespread and attributed it to petty jealousy and a reluctance 
to see others achieve. Compare this view with the image in lines 7-8 of „Häsrät‟, when 
once again the dog metaphor is evoked. This time we find the dogs fighting over the 
spoils. Hence Uyghurs listening to „Häsrät‟ experience feelings of regret combined 
with emotional release or catharsis, in recognition of a painfully familiar social 
phenomenon. 
 
Differing views towards secession 
The Uyghurs were undoubtedly more united as a nation (in the sense of being 
generally opposed to the Han presence) in the mid-1990s than at any other time 
previously, due to the domestic and international factors mentioned above.
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However, there remained difficulties concerning ethno-political mobilization. Groups 
(and I present these as „ideal types‟) that fully subscribed to separatist, ethno-political 
ideologies included young male intellectuals, young male petty entrepreneurs, and the 
unemployed, all hailing from urban settings. Groups who did not necessarily 
subscribe to such ideologies included the older generation, women, and Uyghur 
peasants. In particular, views on secession – and the way to go about achieving this – 
differed significantly across generations, between rural and urban areas, and between 
genders. As Naby had predicted a decade earlier, the attitudes of the young generation 
had become far more radicalized (1986: 245). The elders, however, were not given to 
impetuous acts, while both they and the middle-aged bore the scars of their 
persecution during the Cultural Revolution. Many women remarked to me that the 
Chinese state „would never let go of Xinjiang‟, and preferred to focus on gaining 
equal rights and opportunities for Uyghurs within the current socio-political structure. 
Uyghur peasants had not at that time experienced competition from Han immigrants 
for education, work, and resources on the scale experienced by urban Uyghurs, and so 
their grievances were fewer. Most protested about two issues in particular: the 
imposition by local cadres of adverse, over-centralized farming policies, and the 
vastly unpopular Han-enforced birth control policy. Few, it seemed, had begun to look 
beyond their immediate, everyday circumstances to consider the future of the Uyghur 
nation.  
I would suggest, however, that the dissemination of nationalist discourse 
through the medium of popular song, together with negative oral stereotyping of the 
Han in the cities (and its eventual oral transmission to rural areas) played a significant 
role in the subsequent spread of separatist ideology to the countryside and to other 
social groups. While this is evidently difficult to measure, the year 1997 saw an 
increase in separatist violence such as bombings, armed attacks on Han Chinese 
police, mob attacks directed at Han police, military and civilians, and riots, including 
the largest in Xinjiang since 1949. On 5-6 February, young Uyghurs in the northern 
town of Ghulja attacked Han Chinese civilians indiscriminately on the streets, and 
burned the bodies of the dead. The riot was said to have been sparked by the 
execution of thirty young Uyghur separatists, the arrest of one hundred Muslim 
students with pro-independence views and state suppression of so-called „illegal 
religious activities‟. These developments resulted in an intensified government 
crackdown in the political and religious spheres, and, eventually, the cultural sphere.
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Reports released by Amnesty International in January/April 1999 showed that 
Uyghurs recently detained on suspicion of „ethnic splittism‟ [fenliezhuyi or 
„attempting to split the motherland‟] included secondary school teachers, peasants, 
merchants, a surgeon, a factory worker, „millionaire businesswoman‟ Räbiyä Qadir, 
and even a local Uyghur cadre (Amnesty International, 1999a, b).  
 
Raising awareness: Alim, the gatekeeper 
Confucius once said: „In altering customs and changing habits, nothing is better than 
music‟.44 Like its historical predecessors, the modern Chinese state has made 
concerted efforts to commodify and disarm oppositional art (in the sense posited by 
the Frankfurt theorists of popular culture). In the mid-1990s, however, Uyghur artists 
began to resist these efforts, using new folk as a means to construct and disseminate 
representations of the Uyghur nation that contrasted sharply with the carefully 
packaged, exoticized images of „happy‟, colourful, passive ethnic minorities produced 
by the Han regime (Gladney, 1994). These alternative representations, while not 
necessarily painting a nuanced picture of complex social conditions in the region, 
proved powerful reflections of popular socio-political perceptions and frustrations. 
They thus created an emotional resonance, derived from a sense of „mutual 
validation‟, among Uyghurs of all walks of life. As Harris put it: „The sense of the 
Uyghur community is being effectively redrawn through popular music‟ (2002: 280). 
Through the repetitive processes of performing, listening to (and unconsciously 
hearing) Alim‟s songs, the meanings, perceptions, and assumptions contained therein 
were reproduced throughout urban society, and came to influence attitudes among a 
growing number of individuals in the countryside.
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 Alim‟s lamentations may 
therefore be said to possess an illuminative quality in the modern context, creating 
awareness of the need for ethnic unity in relation to the perceived religio-cultural and 
socio-economic threat posed by the Han. This role of „illuminist‟ is explored in 
„Därwaziwän‟ [The Gatekeeper], a fifth song taken from the cassette Qaldi Iz: „There 
was a time when we lost everything to thieves; From now on, I shall be vigilant, for I 
am the gatekeeper‟. Once more, the Han Chinese are portrayed as colonizer, this time 
as „thieves‟ who have stolen the beautiful land of Xinjiang along with its natural 
resources. Meanwhile, Alim sings in the first person, apparently presenting himself as 
his people‟s lonely saviour.  
 
Conclusion: Popular music, politics, and playing the game 
The events of the latter half of the decade show that, when taken too far by persons of 
a particular disposition, exhortations to ethnic loyalty can lead to violence both within 
and between ethnic groups, that songs of nationalism may – as in the former 
Yugoslavia – „reaffirm hatreds between different peoples‟ (Hudson, 2000: 168). It 
could for instance be argued that one extreme consequence of Alim‟s songs against 
so-called „collaborators‟ (and perhaps one unforeseen by the singer himself) was to 
catalyse an increase in the number of assassinations and attempted assassinations on 
Uyghur cadres and personnel in the mid-late 1990s. In other words, such events not 
only inspired Alim‟s songs, but may also have been inspired by them. This in turn 
begs the question: why have the Chinese authorities seemingly been so slow and 
unsystematic in their sanctioning of Uyghur songs of nationalism? To date, the only 
song to be censored on Alim‟s cassette Qaldi Iz was the title track [Traces]. This is a 
comparatively gentle song and arguably less likely to provoke ethnic tension than 
some others analysed here. Certainly, the language barrier created by publishing lyrics 
in Uyghur, added to the difficulties of interpreting meanings veiled in metaphor and 
allusion, may have partially hindered the monitoring process. Qaldi Iz, based as it is 
on a pre-existing nationalist poem known to the Han authorities, would come under 
suspicion much more rapidly than the original texts, and this is one possible 
explanation why this song was censored where others were not. However, it is my 
contention that just as colonial situations throughout history have produced 
individuals willing to cooperate with the colonizer, Uyghur nationalist song lyrics, 
along with other literary forms, will eventually be translated and made available to the 
Chinese state. Consider, for example, the fact that the nationalist poem, recited at a 
public gathering to celebrate Nawruz (Uyghur New Year) in Ürümchi in March 2002, 
was translated and passed to the authorities within just twenty-four hours, resulting in 
the arrest of the speaker. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that if 
uneducated Uyghur peasants are able to receive and understand the hidden messages 
in Alim‟s songs, educated Han officials, trained to identify political references in 
minority texts, might also be capable of the same.  
One might suggest (though it is pure speculation) that, in this case, the 
Cultural Bureau weighed up the advantages and disadvantages of giving airplay to 
songs that highlight disunity among the Uyghurs and decided that it was in the 
interests of the state to let them circulate. After all, Alim‟s mix of lamentation of 
disunity and exhortation to unity will affect different individuals in different ways. 
There remains a strong likelihood that some Uyghurs, far from reacting positively and 
vowing to build unity among their people, may instead end up internalizing negative 
perceptions such as that of the „bad character trait,‟ resulting in low ethnic self-esteem 
and gradual loss of hope. Conversely, if the authorities were to ban the entire cassette 
or arrest its author, Alim would be heralded as an ethnic hero and martyr and the 
opposite effect would be produced, that of encouraging and fuelling ethnic pride and 
resistance. 
 
Epilogue 
By 2002, the environment surrounding music and politics in Xinjiang had 
significantly changed and public opinion regarding Ömärjan Alim was split. Some of 
those interviewed remained loyal to the singer, and continued to laud him as the 
„voice of the Uyghurs‟. They circulated rumours of his arrest and censorship, and 
claimed with evident pride that he had been warned by the government not to sing 
„songs that threaten the unity of the nationalities‟ [minzu tuanjie]. Others, however, 
deemed him a hypocrite, claiming that he has „sold out‟ in recent years. The example 
given most frequently was the story of Alim reputedly opening a dance hall in his 
northern hometown of Ghulja, to which Uyghur girls came to drink, take drugs, and 
socialize with men. This act was perceived to contravene Alim‟s popular didactic 
piece, „Aldanma, singlim‟ [Don‟t be taken in, sister]. In an interview in 2002, close 
relatives of the artist claimed that Alim had never been in trouble with the state, 
insisting that he was „unaware of the content of his songs‟ since they were written for 
him by local poets and writers and he himself was „entirely uneducated‟. Clearly the 
family‟s standard line of defence, this argument has apparently been – successfully – 
used to defend Alim against charges of „ethnic splittism‟ in court.46 Alim‟s double 
release in 2002, Häsät Qilma [Don't fall prey to envy], appears to contain no 
comparably explicit reference to Uyghur/Han relations, concentrating generally on 
intra-ethnic social themes. Such a shift would certainly suffice to cause ardent Uyghur 
nationalists to deem him a sell-out, and may be precisely the result the Chinese 
authorities had hoped for. Permitting (or perhaps even encouraging?) Alim to 
continue in a diluted or castrated form allows the state to orchestrate his public fall 
from nationalist glory and further promote the sense of hopelessness already taking 
root among the Uyghur people. 
In the wake of the new cultural crackdown, triggered by the aforementioned 
public recital of a nationalist poem in March 2002 and encouraged by partial US 
endorsement of China‟s „anti-terrorist‟ campaign, Xinjiang‟s new folk singers have 
been forced to search for alternative ways to voice popular discontent. In some cases 
(and possibly Alim‟s), this means stepping aside to allow as yet unknown and 
undetected champions of the cause to emerge, for example, Tašmämät Batur, the new 
name on many lips. For Alim‟s closest competitor, Abdurehim Heyit, it has meant 
resorting to the power of music itself. The title track of his new release, Ömüt [Hope], 
is a powerful instrumental, conveying passion, desperation, and determination. In it, 
the dutar may be said to become a „political instrument… giving voice to the 
collective feelings of the group‟ (Cooke and Doornbas, 1982: 53). Friends of the 
singer told me that it was now simply too dangerous to use nationalist lyrics, adding 
that it would be „a mistake to connect Heyit with Ömärjan Alim in any way‟.  
During the current period of maximum state control over the political, 
religious and cultural spheres in Xinjiang, we might expect to see Uyghurs develop 
new, symbolic means of expressing dissatisfaction with their situation. Indeed, 
symbolic acts of dissidence are already emerging in the sphereof religion. While 
numbers of Uyghurs entering the mosques in the regional capital Ürümchi were small 
in the mid-1990s, those same mosques have been pulled down and replaced by new 
ones twice their original size in 2001-2002. Like Heyit‟s instrumental response to 
increased controls on culture, some respondents indicated that the mass return to the 
mosque represents a symbolic act of resistance to the increased repression of religion 
since the mid-1990s. The Chinese state may be able to co-opt Uyghur imams or 
simply replace them with state-trained counterparts, but it remains to be seen whether 
it can replace Allah or the unifying force of Islam itself. Meanwhile, Heyit‟s response 
to the question of whether hope endures in Xinjiang suggests that the new „silence‟ is 
temporary: „Where there‟s life, there‟s hope‟ [Hayat bar bolsa, ömüt bar]. 
 
 
APPENDIX: List of respondents 
 
Key informants 
Abdurehim Heyit: Summer 1996, Qäšqär, South Xinjiang and August-September 
2002, Ürümchi city, North Xinjiang.  
Notes: new folk singer, one of two artists popularly characterized as the „voice 
of the Uyghurs,‟ born in Qäšqär, performed with the Central Minorities Song 
and Dance Troupe in Beijing for two decades, now affiliated to the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region Song and Dance Troupe in Ürümchi city, 
practising Muslim, early forties, male. 
Aliyä: throughout 1995-6, Ürümchi city, North Xinjiang and Kucha, South Xinjiang; 
August-September 2002, Ürümchi city.  
Notes: former postgraduate student, works in social sector, based in Ürümchi 
city, early-late twenties, female. 
Äziz: throughout 1995-6, Ürümchi city, North Xinjiang and Kucha, South Xinjiang; 
August-September 2002, Ürümchi city.  
Notes: university graduate, teacher, based in Ürümchi city, early-late twenties, 
male. 
Dilšat: Summer 1996, Qäšqär, South Xinjiang.  
Notes: university graduate, works in tourist industry, based in Qäšqär, early 
twenties, male. 
Räwiä: throughout 1995-6 and September 2002, Ürümchi city, North Xinjiang.  
Notes: minkaohan (educated in Chinese rather than mother tongue), university 
graduate, employed in state work unit, based in Ürümchi city, late thirties-
early forties, female. 
Šatgül: August-September 2002, Ürümchi city.  
Notes: secondary education only, works in tertiary industry, based in Ürümchi 
city, mid-late forties, female. 
Šöhrat: throughout 1995-6, Ürümchi city, North Xinjiang; June 2002, Europe.  
Notes: university graduate, intellectual, based in Ürümchi city, late twenties-
early thirties, male. 
Tursun: Summer 1996, Aqsu, South Xinjiang.  
Notes: peasant and father of three, living with family in small rural 
community in Aqsu, semi-literate, early thirties, male. 
 
Occasional informants 
Batur: April 1996, Ürümchi city, North Xinjiang.  
Notes: secondary education only, migrant worker, based in Ürümchi city, mid-
thirties, male. 
Karim: Summer 1996, Xotän, South Xinjiang.  
Notes: health professional, based in Xotän, practising Muslim, mid-fifties, 
male. 
Relatives of Ömärjan Alim (new folk singer and the second of two artists popularly 
characterized as the „voice of the Uyghurs‟): September 2002, Ghulja, North 
Xinjiang.  
Notes: all based in Ghulja, all female and representing all generations. 
Author’s note: In order to protect the anonymity of informants, all names have been 
altered, birthplaces are omitted, and only broad descriptions of profession are given. 
 
 
Discography 
Alim, Ömärjan. Pärwayim Peläk [Destiny Is My Concern]. (Censored: no publishing 
details). 
Alim, Ömärjan. Qaldi Iz [Traces]. (Ürümchi: Minzu chubanshe, CN-M06-95-0002-0, 
1995). 
Alim, Ömärjan. Häsät Qilma [Don‟t Fall Prey to Envy] Parts 1 and 2. 
(Ürümchi:Xinjiang yinxiang chubanshe, CN-H11-01-374-00/A, 2002). 
Heyit, Abdurehim. Mung-zar [Sadness]. Parts 1, 2, and 3. (Ši‟än: Ši‟än kino studiyasi 
un-sin näšriyati, CN-H02-94-316-00/A, 1994).  
Heyit, Abdurehim. Ömüt [Hope]. (Beijing: Zhongguo minzu yinxiang chubanshe, 
CN-A25-02-0003-2/V, 2002). 
Ge'er, Teng, 'The Land of the Blue Wolf', Meng Sui Feng Piao [Dreams Float with 
the Wind](Baidai (EMI) / Zhonghua wenyi yinxiang lianhe chubanshe, CN-
A49-94-348-00/A, 1994). 
Ge'er, Teng, 'The Mongol', Teng Ge’er: Hei Junma [Teng Ge‟er: Black Steed] 
(Xueyuan yinxiang chubanshe CN-A56-96-0001-0/A, 1996). 
Notes 
                                               
1
 This chapter develops themes that appeared briefly in my thesis (Smith, 1999) and 
combines interview data and media analyses from it with new song translations and 
new interviews conducted in 2002. I am indebted to the Economic and Social 
Research Council for supporting initial fieldwork in 1995-96. Also, I would like to 
extend my thanks to co-panellists and members of the audience for their useful 
suggestions and comments at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian 
Studies in New York, 2003. 
2
 See Hoppe (1992) for an ethnic breakdown of Xinjiang‟s population.  
3
 Gardner Bovingdon (2003) is currently engaged in fascinating research on the ways 
in which contemporary Uyghurs preserve and disseminate an alternative (and 
sometimes fanciful) vision of a distinct national past through the medium of oral 
histories. 
4
 For a detailed analysis of ethnic boundary maintenance in two towns in Xinjiang in 
the mid-1990s, see Smith (2002) and Bellér-Hann (2002). I refer to the Han Chinese 
as „The Han‟ or „The Han Chinese‟ throughout this chapter in recognition of the 
tendency of many Uyghurs in 1995-1996 to portray the Han as an immoveable, 
uniform „Other‟ in everyday popular discourse. This in no way suggests that all Han 
settlers in Xinjiang are „the same‟, simply that Uyghur perceptions were often voiced 
in uncompromising terms. Nor does my use of this blanket term suggest that all 
Uyghur views on the Han are identical. In fact, Uyghurs from different age groups 
hold nuanced views with regard to Han immigrants with older Uyghurs distinguishing 
between first-generation Han settlers who were willing to respect local culture and 
newly arrived immigrants who are not (Smith 2000). 
                                                                                                                                      
5
 I employ the term „collaborator‟ throughout, although the closest equivalent to the 
original Uyghur term [maqulči or „person who says “OK”‟] would be „Yes-man‟. 
Despite common Uyghur perceptions of their indigenous leaders, it is of course 
impossible to categorize all Uyghur officials in black and white terms as either a „man 
of the people‟ or a „collaborator‟. Interviews carried out in 1996 suggested rather that 
individuals occupied different points on a scale between altruism and self-interest, and 
that these positions were far from static. See also Stan Toops‟ illuminating 
comparison of two recent Uyghur leaders, Tömür Dawamat and Ismail Amat, in 
which the former is characterized rather as a „cipher‟ for state-generated rhetoric, 
while the latter is shown to pursue a viable political agenda that reflects the realities of 
the region (1992). 
6
 I borrow this term from the Albanian iluminist, connoting a poet who gives his life 
to spreading a message of self-elevation to his fellow countrymen (Sugarman, 1999: 
447). 
7
 These days, Qarašar forms part of the Bayingholin Mongol autonomous prefecture. 
While Uyghurs prefer the historical name, the Chinese have renamed the area Yanji 
Hui Autonomous County [Yanji huizu zizhixian]. 
8
 For writings on the Yaqub Beg rebellion (1866-1877), see Kim (1986) and Tsing 
(1961); on the Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan (1933-1934), see 
Forbes (1986); and on the East Turkestan Republic (1944-1949), see Forbes (1986) 
and Benson (1990).  
9
 In my writings on Uyghur identity, I start from the assumption that human identities 
are relative and conjunctural, in other words that they are formed in relation to an 
„Other,‟ and are fluid and changing, formed at particular moments in time in response 
to a specific set of social, economic, and/or political circumstances (Clifford, 1988: 
                                                                                                                                      
10-11; Gladney, 1996). For a discussion of the relative and fluid nature of ethnic 
boundaries, see Barth (1969) and Eriksen (1993: 10–12).  
10
 The Salars are said to have originated from a Turkmen tribe (Schwarz, 1984: 39-40), 
and therefore might be said to have their own country in Turkmenistan. The Tatars 
and the Salars in Xinjiang numbered only 4,821 and 3,660 persons respectively in 
1990, compared with a Uyghur population of 7,194,675 (Hoppe, 1992: 360).  
11
 Prior to the Chinese Communists taking power in 1949, Western travellers 
identified the region as „East Turkestan,‟ reflecting the dominant presence of Turkic 
groups. The words „East Turkestan‟ also appeared in the names of the independent 
regimes of the 1930s and 40s, and continue to be favoured by some contemporary 
separatist movements.  
12
 Tuohy shows how the Chinese state has used popular music and song variously as a 
means to assess the attitudes of the empire‟s subjects, mobilize the nation against 
foreign invaders, and represent the nation in a way that stresses ethnic inclusiveness 
(2001: 110-118). See also Perris (1985: 93-122).  
13
 This term was coined by Harris in her survey of the popular music industry in 
Xinjiang (2002: 272). 
14
 Baranovitch (2001) focuses on the increasing degree of agency displayed by 
minority artists in China in the creation of alternative representations of their ethnic 
identity. Among his „new voices‟ is Inner Mongolian singer Teng Ge‟er.  
15
 For details of Kösän‟s experiences, see Harris (2002: 265-66). 
16
 Heyit‟s 1994 trilogy, Mung-zar [Sadness], was released through a studio in Xi‟an, 
Sha‟anxi province, far to the east of Xinjiang. 
17
 For a full translation in English, see Smith (1999: 176-77). 
                                                                                                                                      
18
 These days, women can take part equally with men in a non-religious form of 
mäšräp, intended to allow people to rejoice through the medium of the performing 
arts (Mackerras, 1985: 68). Up until the 1950s, however, participants were all male. 
The mäšräp functioned as a rite of passage into manhood, a vehicle for regulating 
moral, religious, and social etiquette, and a means of forming male peer groups. In the 
mid-late 1990s, this „traditional‟ form of mäšräp was resurrected in the city of Ghulja, 
North Xinjiang, and among Uyghur communities in Almaty, Qazaqstan with the 
modern aim of creating and maintaining Uyghur national culture (Roberts, 1998: 675). 
Such mäšräp quickly came under government suspicion in the People‟s Republic as 
popular arenas for the dissemination of separatist ideologies and literatures. 
19
 Mackerras remarks that the spoken play [huaju] popular among Han Chinese has 
singularly failed to make an impression among the Uyghur because it lacks music, the 
ingredient so essential to their cultural identity (1985: 66). 
20
 Ötkür‟s novels were fictional accounts of events that occurred before the Chinese 
Communists came to power in 1949. In them, he expressed themes and ideas relevant 
to the present, escaping the censor by dressing these in analogous historical situations 
(Rudelson, 1997: 163-65).  
21
 See Bellér-Hann on the history of script changes in Xinjiang (1991: 72-5). 
22
 See, for example, „Čillang Xoruzum‟ [Crow, My Rooster!] by Abdurehim Heyit, 
from the tape Mung-zar [Sadness]. Harris gives examples in Ömärjan Alim‟s work 
(2002: 278). There is an interesting comparison here with the Albanian nationalist 
movement during the period from the start of the Albanian War of Independence in 
1898 through the declaration of an independent Albania in 1912 to its recognition by 
the Great Powers in 1918. Sugarman writes that villagers gained a „deep-seated sense 
of themselves as being Albanian‟ only after nationalist poems were transformed into 
                                                                                                                                      
men‟s narrative songs (1999: 441-45). In this process, figures such as çetë [armed 
guerrilla unit] commander Sali Butka composed revolutionary poems that fused 
features of village song texts with nationalist themes in a form of folk poetry. She 
hypothesizes that cetë members, who were encouraged to become literate, began to 
sing the poems as songs, and that these were then taken up by fellow villagers when 
members returned home. 
23
 In presenting this phenomenon as a two-way process, I follow Tuohy, who models 
musical nationalism in China as a „mutually transformative process of making music 
national and of realizing the nation musically‟ (2001: 108-9) and Sugarman, who sees 
Albanian literary figures as simultaneously producing the nationalist discourses of the 
Albanian Rilindja („rebirth‟) and being produced as national subjects by them (1999: 
421). 
24
 Harris notes that Xinjiang‟s bazaars function as an „unofficial pop chart‟, where the 
number of shops and restaurants playing a certain cassette provide a reliable guide to 
the latest hit (2002: 270). See also Baranovitch who writes that Teng Ge‟er‟s 1989 
release „The Mongol‟ was still frequently sung in rural areas of Inner Mongolia in the 
mid-1990s, „suggesting that his alternative [ethnic] representation is accepted by a 
large portion of the people he claims to represent‟(2001: 371). 
25
 An exception might be „Wäsiyät‟ [Testament], which tackles the social problem of 
drug abuse and addiction among young Uyghurs, although many Uyghurs relate even 
this problem to their sense of political impotence, or to the unequal life chances 
afforded them under the Han hegemony. For an English translation of the poem „Iz‟ 
[Traces], see Allworth and Pahta (1988). The song was subsequently banned from 
radio airplay and public performance. 
                                                                                                                                      
26
 Inner Mongolian singer Teng Ge‟er similarly sang in 1994 of aggressive Han 
colonization and ecological destruction in his homeland in The Land of the Blue Wolf. 
Baranovitch describes the song as „simultaneously a tragic elegy, a cry of protest, and 
an effort to raise the consciousness of other Mongols‟ (2001: 369). 
27
 This song alludes to a tiny minority of young Uyghur women in Ürümchi who are 
said to have adopted „bad modern ways‟ (where modernity is perceived to have been 
introduced by the Han and as running counter to Islamic social mores). These girls 
adopt a role comparable to that of the Japanese „hostess‟, drinking, dancing, and, in 
rare cases, sleeping with Han businessmen for money.  
28
 A full list of respondents is available for reference in the appendix. 
29
 In recognition of the fact that „content analysts are not innocent readers‟ (Frith, 
cited in Shepherd, 1999: 172) and in order to achieve inter-subjectivity, all song 
translations and their interpretations were prepared by the author in consultation with 
Uyghur respondents in Europe and Xinjiang during the summer of 2002. For 
respondents‟ invaluable help, I extend my sincere gratitude. Elegance in the target 
language is partly sacrificed in favour of retaining as far as possible the original 
vocabulary, metaphors, and cultural concepts in the source text. 
30
 See also Bovingdon‟s account of a lively exchange between two women – one 
Uyghur and one Han – on the question of indigeneity to the region (2002: 49-52).  
31
 I deal with Uyghur perceptions of socio-economic inequalities in depth elsewhere 
(Smith, 1999: 242-68). 
32
 See Cloonan and Garofalo (2003) on the social and political aspects of popular 
music and censorship. 
33
 Uyghur leaders are hand picked by the Chinese government according to the 
appropriateness of their political attitudes. They must normally complete five years of 
                                                                                                                                      
political education at the Central University for Nationalities (formerly the Central 
Institute for Nationalities) in Beijing before assuming their posts. Mackerras observed 
that „no Uyghur could rise to real power who espoused local nationalism‟, and this 
remains the case today (1985: 77). 
34
 According to Ämät‟s annotation, the proverb implies that a man who thinks of his 
people and native place is pure while one who thinks only of the road to riches is 
selfish (2001: 399). 
35
 In her work on Albanian nationalism, Sugarman hypothesizes that patriotic slogans 
such as „Albania hates a traitor‟ appearing in songs included in nationalist intellectual 
Mitko‟s 1878 collection of folk songs had probably been added long after the songs‟ 
creation, in an attempt to awaken and unite the Albanian people (1999: 425). 
36
 See Alim‟s song „Mehman Bašlidim‟ [I brought home a guest).  
37
 Compare the term zougou [literally „running dog‟ or stooge] in Chinese, used to 
describe Chinese who collaborated with Western or Japanese imperialists. Zougou 
translates into Uyghur as yalaqči [literally „person who licks‟]. 
38
 Compare Uyghur rock singer Abdulla‟s song „Šükür‟ [Thanks], which deals with 
Uyghur passivity (Harris 2002: 276-77; Harris gives no discographic details as this 
was a live performance). 
39
 See Smith for a catalogue of ethnic disturbances in Xinjiang 1949-1997 (1999: 
Appendix I). 
40
 Compare shifting boundaries in South Africa with regard to „internal‟ and „external‟ 
Others. In the 1970s, Inkatha encouraged their members to defend the Zulu kingdom 
against „outsiders‟ (at that time the government, whites, Indians, and Xhosas). Yet in 
the 1980s, Zulus opposed to the Zulu kingdom were targeted as „the enemy within‟ 
                                                                                                                                      
(Morris Szeftel, African Studies Seminar, Department of Politics, University of Leeds, 
7/12/94). 
41
 Lien ho pao, Hong Kong, 27 February 1995 in Summary of World Broadcasts (Asia 
Pacific), 1 March 1995, FE/2240 G/4. 
42
 See Bovingdon (2002) for an engaging account of means of everyday resistance 
among ordinary Uyghurs in the latter half of the 1990s, and Smith (2000) for an 
analysis of the emergence of ethno-political ideologies among Uyghur youth.  
43
 For information about the repressive measures adopted by the Chinese state since 
1995 and in the post-September 11 period, see Kellner (2002: 16-27), Amnesty 
International (1997; 1998; 1999a, b; 2002), and Human Rights Watch (2001). 
44
 Confucius, quoted by Kong Yingda, Liji zhengyi (cited in Tuohy 2001: 107).  
45
 The Chinese state has deliberately employed musical repetition in its goal to create 
a „voice of the people‟, through daily broadcasts on television, radio, and even public 
loudspeakers (Tuohy 2001: 117; 123). Alim‟s messages have been popularized on one 
level through a similar process of repetition, with Uyghur customers „accidentally‟ 
hearing his songs as they browse the bazaar. I was fascinated during a stay in Kucha 
in 1996 to find a microcosm of competing musical nationalisms, with state-sanctioned, 
co-opted minority music blaring out of public loudspeakers in the predominantly Han-
settled New Town, as independently-produced Uyghur pop musics blared from 
cassette kiosks in the predominantly Uyghur-settled Old Town. 
46
 Personal communication with Rachel Harris, November 2002. 
